This paper is a draft submission to the

Inclusive Growth in Africa: Measurement, Causes, and Consequences

20–21 September 2013 Helsinki, Finland

This is a draft version of a conference paper submitted for presentation at UNU-WIDER’s conference, held in Helsinki on 20–21 September 2013. This is not a formal publication of UNU-WIDER and may reflect work-in-progress.

THIS DRAFT IS NOT TO BE CITED, QUOTED OR ATTRIBUTED WITHOUT PERMISSION FROM AUTHOR(S).
Informal Urban Development and Service Delivery in Mozambique: Do Boycotts Improve Trash Collection?

In theory, decentralization is supposed to promote accountability at the local level and hence improve municipal performance by encouraging public participation, building government capacity, and increasing political competition. Mozambique, a post-conflict, low-income new democracy that implemented a major decentralization effort in 1998, provided a natural laboratory in which to investigate how these factors cause variation in municipal performance. Even in the context of weak institutions and serious constraints, local governments were able to improve municipal trash collection in instances in which civil society had some leverage, through a combination of successful boycotts, strategic donor assistance and municipal leadership. These findings extend beyond international relations to the fields of development studies, public administration and political science.

Author: Beatrice A. Reaud, Ph.D.
University Affiliation: American University
Email: bea.reaud@american.edu
JEL classification: H11, H71, O17, P16
Key Words: public administration, trash collection, Africa, revenue generation, decentralization
Decentralization reforms…with the process of political transition in the 1990s…became associated with …an emergence of new actors, mobilization of ‘civil society’, construction of a local political playing field and a renewal of participatory practices. Nevertheless … implementation…has still not had a significant impact in the…capacity to respond through local government to the necessities of residents and improve the conditions of their lives (Forquilha 2007, 1-2).


In 1998, we died like ants. Due to the Mayor, now we see streets paved and things are starting to look normal. Although we may not have trash collection where I am, it is clear that this mayor is working and that things have gotten better.

Focus group participant, Beira, Mozambique, March 2009.

1 Introduction

In the euphoria created by the democratization wave in the 1990s in developing and transition countries, scholars heralded the “end of history” as democratic government spread to improve the quality of life for residents all over the world (Huntington 1991; Fukuyama 1993). Decentralization has been embraced by donors and recipient governments alike as a way to, in theory, strengthen nascent democratic governments in weak states by promoting accountability and better service delivery because local governments are closer to the citizens they serve and citizens are empowered to hold public officials accountable (Cheema and Rondinelli 2007; Bräutigam 2004; Bird 2000; Bird and Vaillancourt 1998). As a result, implementation of decentralization programs was, and continues to be, an integral component of
democratization strategies in the developing world, despite mixed results as the above-stated quotes suggest.¹

The purpose of this paper is to explore the extent to which civic participation motivates municipalities to improve service delivery, particularly in informal neighborhoods, where access and political influence tend to be thought of as barriers to that delivery. My hypothesis is that decentralization promotes accountability at the local level and hence, improves municipal performance, by encouraging public participation. In other words, decentralization should improve performance because it gives civil society an opportunity to hold local officials responsible to providing municipal services by incentivizing them with political pressure (votes, lobbies, and increased citizen participation) (see Table 1.1). More succinctly, decentralization creates incentives that motivate government officials to act and opportunities for residents to pressure them.

So, what accounts for variation in municipal performance in a country like Mozambique, which is subject to resource constraints and weak institutions? My research found that, across all four municipal cases, civil society was generally weak, municipalities relied on central government transfers and donor project funding, and a single party dominated state resources. However, I found some interesting variation in the presence of these conditions that requires some rethinking of the current theoretical debates. Civil society organizations are fluid and adaptive to resource availability.

¹ Mozambican scholar Fedilx Kulipossa concluded that “decentralization is a complex and multi-faceted phenomenon that may have both positive and negative effects” (Kulipossa 2004, 768)(Cheema and Rondinelli 2007, 8). Both Crook and Manor’s and Agrawal and Ribot’s works respectively reference World Bank and USAID reports on promoting decentralization (See pp. 2-3 in Crook and Manor and footnotes 2 and 7 in Agrawal and Ribot) (Crook and Manor 1998)(Agrawal and Ribot 1999).
While not a pre-requisite to improving municipal service provision, in two cases, civil society provided a venue for participation and voice that led to improvements in municipal service in the form of protests and lobbying for city contracts and the creations of alternative channels of participation through participatory budgeting processes. Donor aid helped build technical capacity in both cases. Second, regardless of party, mayoral leadership mattered in improving municipal service delivery. This paper focuses on how participation and voice in four cases had varying effects on trash collection.

1.1 Review of Factors for Selection of Municipal Cases

In this section, I discuss how I selected the four cases. First, I gathered available secondary data for my independent variables (participation, revenue, and elections). While I was able to gather data on revenue and elections for all thirty-three cases, I only had participation data on twelve. As a result, I examined how these variables worked in conjunction with each other to pick the cases based on the independent variables for which I had data. I assigned a point value of Low (1), Medium (1.5) and High (2) for each independent variable. For participation, I examined secondary data on civil society. For revenue, I determined the per capita average for aid and all other sources of revenue and then assigned a rank depending on whether the per capita for a particular municipality was above or below the average. Lastly, for elections, I assigned a Low, Medium or High ranking contingent upon whether there was no change in party or mayoral candidate (L), no change in party but a change in mayor (M), change in party and change in mayor (H). I added these point
values and was able to choose four cases from these three categories. Those cases were Beira and Dondo (High), Maputo (Medium), and Matola (Low) (see Table 1.2).

I found some interesting patterns that I discuss below that led me to focus on examining my dependent variable—municipal performance—in four municipalities. In arraying my data, however, I found substantial gaps, as discussed, especially in data on participation. As a result, I validated my selection by conducting more than 60 field interviews with the World Bank-sponsored Municipal Donors Working Group, Mozambican government officials from the Ministries of Planning and Development, State Administration and Finance, the National Association of Municipalities of Mozambique (ANAMM), NGOs and academics. I conducted eleven focus groups where I asked residents to discuss municipal performance and 120 semi-structured interviews in four cities through fieldwork in 2008 and 2009 and reviewed four years of budget data for all four cases.2

2 I acknowledge that there are two critiques to this approach. First, positivist approaches posit that ideal case designs typically involve large-n studies (King, Keohane, and Verba, 1994). These scholars further that cases should be chosen based on variation of the independent variables to ensure that the outcome being measured is attributable to the factors posited in the hypothesis. “The best ‘intentional’ design selects observations to ensure variation in the explanatory variable…without regard to the values of the dependent variables” (Ibid, 140). The second critique of this approach is that four cases are not enough to explore the variance that three factors have on service delivery. King, Keohane and Verba argue that “limiting the number of explanatory variables for which …(one) wants to make causal inferences….maximize(s) leverage” (King, Keohane, and Verba, 123). The challenge my approach potentially poses is that changes in the dependent variable could be the result of something other than what I hypothesize in the relationship between my explanatory and dependent variables.

My view is that exploring relationships and processes between donors, the central government, municipalities, and residents required a small-n, case study approach. It provided the analytical leverage I need to see how multiple factors affect municipal performance. Furthermore, this approach allowed me to select cases based on both dependent and independent variables. While choosing cases based on explanatory variables, regardless of the values of dependent variables, may be the best “intentional” design, King, Keohane and Verba acknowledge that, “selection should allow for the possibility of at least some variation on the dependent variable” (King, Keohane, and Verba 1994, 129). Similarly, they acknowledge that “random selection is not generally appropriate for small-n research”,
1.2 Mozambican Civil Society: Current State and Departure Point

Key findings of recent studies into Mozambican civil society and citizen participation indicate that it is weak for two reasons: first, organizations lack financial and organizational capacity; and second, citizens in practice have little economic and political influence. A 2007 study sponsored by the Mozambican Foundation for Community Development and the United Nations Development Program found that civil society has difficulty effectively monitoring the state because the interaction between the two is “superficial and informal” due to “public and private institutions (that) are still very underdeveloped, rudimentary, sharply focused around bipolarized political power and without mechanisms for the effective representativeness of citizenship” (Francisco, Mucavele, Monjane, Seuane 2008, xxvi). Donors tend to focus on civil society organizations in urban areas, missing opportunities to work with rural organizations. Aside from factors...
like civil society capacity and political constraints, the lack of “critical citizenship” is another factor that hampers civil society in Mozambique. Mattes and Shenga concluded in a national study of Mozambican political attitudes that while participation in organizations (specifically, community development organizations) does enable people to form opinions about the performance of democracy and governance, Mozambicans are less critical of their government’s performance than other Afrobarometer countries because of a low-level of formal education, political information and interest in politics (Mattes and Shenga 2007).

I set out to investigate how participation created pressure on the municipalities to improve service provisions. I also looked for other evidence of participation such as the ability for citizens to voice concern over and affect municipal policy. I measured the strength of civil society organizations in two ways: access and control to resources—or what I term “financial sustainability”—and influence over municipal policy. I measured financial sustainability by examining if civil society organizations have access to regular income over which they have discretion. Maputo was the only case, in which the neighborhood trash collection organizations had access to regular income over which they had some discretion. A separate, but relevant, finding was that donors in Maputo worked with neighborhood associations to both build their capacity to collect trash in
informal neighborhoods and lobby the municipality for contracts to create a steady stream of income. I measured how civil society organizations affected municipal performance by examining episodes in which civil society organizations successfully sought and received concessions in municipal policy.

I found in two cases in which participation manifested itself in more direct citizen participation in the form of boycotts and neighborhood hearings that affected municipal decision-making. In Maputo, 2002 citizen protests boycotting a new trash fee caused the municipality to alter its policy to a more rationale fee schedule. In Dondo, neighborhood hearings in the form of the municipality’s participatory budget process provide a channel of direct communication between citizens and the municipality related to infrastructure investments and forced the municipality to justify these investment decisions on a regular basis. In both instances, donors worked with the municipality to resolve boycotts in Maputo or institute citizen-municipal channels as was the case in Dondo.

In summary, I hypothesized that Maputo, Beira, and Dondo would have strong civil society organizations in the two test areas and Matola to have weak civil society organizations (see Table 1.3). I found that financial sustainability and influence over municipal policy—two of my measures of civil society strength—were not pre-requisites to high municipal performance in trash collection. The type of donor assistance and the concessions the municipality made to delegate municipal responsibilities to those organizations were two factors present not only in Maputo but also in Dondo and Beira that led active civil society organizations to
facilitate access to municipal services even though these organizations were not strong, as was the case in Dondo and Beira. I also found evidence of how citizen voice through protests in Maputo effectively influenced the way the CMM charge these fees.

1.3 How Services Work: Solid Waste Management (SWM) General Organization

Trash collection became a municipal responsibility as per 1998 decentralization reforms (Waty 2000, 111). The municipality is responsible for nine general functions surrounding trash collection, which include provision of

---

4 Both national and local law provide for the provision of trash collection for residents of municipalities, which is rooted in the care and maintenance of the environment. According to the Constitution of the Republic, article 90:

(1) All cities have a right to live in an balance environment and have the right to defend it;

(2) The State and the local autarchies in collaboration with associations that defend the environment adopt policies of the defense of the environment and see to the rational utilization of all natural resources. (Constitution of the Republic of Moçambique, Plural Editores: Maputo, 2007, p. 25)

The National Environmental Policy, approved by the National Assembly in Resolution no. 595 of the 3rd of August, indicates that there is a interdependence between development and the environment through the Ministério da Coordenação Ambiental (MICOA) and the municipalities. MICOA has produced a series of regulations governing solid waste management (SWM), which include the Strategy of Integrated Solid Waste Management, February 2004 and Decree no 13/2006 of the 15 of June. One MICOA decree, 13/2006 of 15 of June specifically vests municipalities with the responsibility of approving the standard of solid waste management (SWM), fixing the fees for the provision of service, removal and depositing of said waste and licensing establishments that produce this waste. These responsibilities are further codified in Law no. 11/97 of the 31 of May of 1997, article 25, subsection b, that the municipality collect and treat trash and article 13, which allows municipalities to charge fees (Andrade, Autarquias Locais: Legislação Fundamental: 111 and 105). Law no. 11/97, articles 70 and 71 specifically provide for the charging the collection and treatment of solid waste and the application of fines for individuals who violate municipal regulations of no more than 10 times the minimum national wage (Andrade, 133). Each municipality is charged with enacting its own regulation governing municipal activities, which include SWM.
public containers and collection and disposal of trash. Case study cities provide this service in a variety of ways, which range from private contractors, city employees, and microenterprises, and at a variety of levels from modern trash trucks and skip loaders to tractors and handcarts. Neighborhood organizations sprouted up largely as a result of donor funding. Organizations take difference shapes, with some comprised of neighborhood volunteers while others become microenterprises. Municipalities have arrangements with Electricidade de Moçambique (EDM) to collect trash fees through electricity bills. EDM charges each municipality a monthly flat fee to perform this service, which is a percentage of the total trash fees collected that varies by municipality. Matola’s percentage was the lowest at 10 percent while Beira’s percentage was the highest at 25 percent. EDM not only has the ability to collect fees but also the ability to apply an effective sanction for unpaid fees by cutting off the electricity. This sanction is, of course, only effective for those who have electricity, which the majority of Mozambicans do not (EDM 2011).6

5 Responsibilities typically include location of public containers for disposal of trash, trash pick-up, transportation of trash, storage of equipment and vehicles related to SWM, transfer for trash treatment of solid waste, sweeping, and elimination of solid waste and final internment, typically in an open-air dump site.

6 EDM covers only 36 percent of Mozambique. The south, where Maputo and Matola are located, has the highest level of coverage at 43 percent. The center, where Dondo and Beira are located, has the lowest at 28 percent.
2 Analysis by Case

2.1 Maputo

I hypothesized that strong civil society organizations influenced the high level of performance in trash collection in Maputo (CMM) (see Table 1.3). Specifically, I expected that civil society organizations would be able to exert pressure over the municipality to collect trash. I found neighborhood organizations that lobbied the municipality for service contracts to extend service to informal neighborhoods and some became both financially sustainable municipal service providers.

In the area of trash collection, I found that neighborhood microenterprises, which started as associations funded by donors, grew to pressure the municipality to provide contracts, and then converted into private contractors, extending the CMM’s reach into the informal neighborhoods. Under Diamond’s definition, these organizations might be considered private—thereby disqualifying them as civil society organizations (Diamond 1997). However, these private contractors either started as neighborhood organizations that become microenterprises or continued to remain neighborhood organizations that donors developed to become contractors and fill a gap in service.
In 2001, Maputo was known as the “cidade baixo lixo” (the city under garbage). By 2008, the CMM provided daily trash collection in formal areas of the municipality and some service to informal neighborhoods. How was the CMM able to implement these changes? A combination of donor support of fledgling community organizations, citizen protest, microenterprises and municipal leadership explain the improved outcome. I examined how citizen protests in 2002 against the introduction of flat trash fee pressured the CMM to re-examined and re-introduce an alternative, which was better received by Maputo residents. Also, I observed how civil society in the form of two neighborhood organizations was strong. Specifically, I examined two specific examples of organizations, which evolved into contractors for the municipality, thereby extending the CMM’s ability to provide trash collection in a portion of informal neighborhoods. These organizations contained components of Diamond’s “voluntary, self-generating, at least partially self-supporting (and) autonomous from the state” but, in one case, the organizations became a private microenterprise (Diamond 1997, 6). As contractors, these organizations became financially sustainable and influenced municipal policy such that they both received a share of municipal resources and extended the CMM’s ability to provide trash collection into previously inaccessible informal neighborhoods.

---

7 Author interview, Town Councillor for Sanitation and Salubrity, Maputo City Hall, October 7, 2008.
2.1.1 Protests, Organizations, and Donors: Determining Revenue and Lobbying for Contracts To Fill in the Gaps

The 2000 floods created the worst flooding Maputo had seen in a century. The piles of trash that accumulated as a result of these floods and the lack of ability for the CMM to adequately respond created situations in which one long-time resident, living on the near-top floor of a 10-story building, recalls swarms of flies floating into the kitchen on a daily basis. In 2001, a private contractor compounded the problem by walking off the job further prompting the central government’s intervention in providing emergency assistance to collect trash. By 2002, the GTZ-supported Assistance to Maputo’s Solid Waste Management project (AGRESU) began work with the CMM to introduce a flat trash fee.

A 20 MTn (less than $1USD) trash fee was passed by the Mayor and City Council in 2001 and went into effect the following year. The timing of introducing this fee could hardly have been worse. As citizens were being asked to pay for trash collection, piles of trash were at their highest and so citizens were outraged that they were now being asked to pay for a service they did see functioning. Citizens voiced their anger at City Council meetings. Residents in rich and poor sections of Maputo blocked major arteries, including one to the airport in what seemed to be a simultaneous outpouring of frustration among city residents at the lack of service and burden of a new fee. This fee was repealed in five months and the CMM did not collect any fees for the rest of the year. However, the CMM did
roll out an education campaign regarding the role and relevance of charging a trash fee so residents could learn more about it.

Throughout this time, AGRESU worked closely with the CMM to do feasibility studies to understand the market for charging trash fees and how to design a fee scale that would be compatible with long-term sustainable financing of trash collection while being equitable. By mid-2003, these studies resulted in a fee scale that was linked to electricity usage that shifted the burden of payment to those that, in theory, produced more trash and could likely afford to pay more in the trash fee. The CMM, with AGRESU, also began to explore how to charge “big” producers (i.e., commercial producers) at a level consistent with the work the City did to collect their trash, thus shifting costs in a more rational fashion. These protests and subsequent repeals and adjustments also forced the CMM to work with neighborhood organizations in a new way—as contractors.

Maputo has contractual relationships with over 20 microenterprises and community organizations, which provide service to several informal neighborhoods. However, this was the result of almost two years of negotiations after the 2000 floods between a small subset of neighborhood organizations and the CMM, with the assistance of donors. The 2000 floods and associated donor assistance combined to both create fertile conditions for the development and sustenance of microenterprises and motivated the CMM to work with them in three
neighborhoods: Urbanização, Maxaquene A, and Xipamanine bairros. In 2000, Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) began cholera prevention remediation in Urbanização to combat flood after-effects. A coalition of community leaders formed, which became known as the ADASBU. At first, they volunteered to sweep paths and, subsequently, turned into a business that hired community residents to collect trash door-to-door for 2MTn daily per home. MSF picked up the shortfall in fees, purchased dumpsters for the bairro, and helped ADASBU register with the government for non-profit status, which qualified it for CMM contracts. In 2004, the CMM extended one of its first contracts to ADASBU for USD$1,000/month to continue primary collection in Urbanização (Kruks-Wisner 2006, 44).

Associação Kithunga originally began as a volunteer neighborhood initiative in September 2006 of 76 members of the Organization of Mozambican Women, the national women’s mass organization. They started collecting trash and raising awareness within the neighborhood about the risks of cholera and malaria, collected the trash once a week, and swept the roads twice daily. The Association started working with the Urban District 2 town councilor to involve the CMM.

---

8 The 2000 floods exacerbated the already precarious health and sanitation of Maputo, a city with a sewage system that had not been updated since the 1940s, and a population that had grown due to war and subsequent migration to the cities.

9 Joaquim Stretz, AGRESU interview in Maputo at the Feira Ambiental, September 21, 2008.

10 Xipamanine is a neighborhood that consists of much of the cities commercial activity. The residential areas are informal, cinder-block homes lining winding, narrow dirt roads, tucked behind the commercial areas. The Association was founded in 2006 by a long-time neighborhood resident, vendor, and Xipamanine Market Merchants Association treasurer.
With the town councilor’s support, the Association now has a CMM contract for primary collection in Urban Districts 2 and 5.

This section discussed how the expression of voice throughout the city and strong civil society organizations, with the assistance of donors, positively improved municipal performance of trash collection in Maputo by extending its reach as municipal contractors. Seed funding from donors and technical assistance in formalizing their organizations either as non-profits or for-profits was a critical component in helping these organizations become financially sustainable as city contractors. Donors helped these organizations lobby the CMM for access to contracts and this successful effort led to an extension of municipal trash collection to informal areas. In conclusion, Maputo’s civil society organizations were strong because they were financially sustainable and were able, even if only limitedly, to influence municipal policy.

2.2 Beira

I expected that civil society organizations would be able to exert pressure over the municipality to provide vendors and citizens better services in Beira. Specifically, I hypothesized that Beira (CMB)’s civil society organizations would be strong, driving the high level of performance I observed in the two test areas (see Table 1.3). I found that, while neighborhood organizations provided primary trash collection in some informal neighborhoods, these groups expanded and contracted based on the availability of donor funding. These observations suggest that factors other than civil society organizations –namely, an increase in own-
source revenue and mayoral leadership –drove Beira’s performance in the area of trash collection.

2.2.1 Beira Trash Collection

Prior to 2005, Beira (CMB) was known as the unhealthiest city in Mozambique (“40 por cento” 2005). So how did the CMB convert itself to a national model? Strong leadership from Mayor Simango combined with donor support (Folha Informativa 2002; Beira Já Tem Meios 2006). Neighborhood organizations were not strong enough here to play a regular role in the improvement of trash collection because they were not financially sustainable and they did not influence municipal policy in such a way as to consistently improve trash collection. However, these

---

11 In 2005, its HIV/AIDS infection rate was 40 percent. Sofala province, of which Beira is the capital and largest city, had an average malarial fatality rate of 12 percent, 3 percentage points above the national average, and cholera fatality of 19 percent, 10 percentage points above the national average from 2002 to 2007. The fact that most of Beira lies below sea level in a tropical climate and the water sanitation system dates back to colonial times also makes it prone to flooding.

12 Unlike Maputo, the CMB conducts almost all the trash collection directly, without the use of private contractors. The CMB offers residential, hospital and commercial trash collection services and charges an array of prices for each service. In one example, as late as 2006, trash was still accumulating in piles on the streets, which caused a fire. The CMB purchased a $100,000 USD dump truck and $130,000 USD flatbed container truck to increase the city’s capacity to remove garbage. Furthermore, the CMB purchased a $40,000 USD tow truck to work exclusively in the shantytowns. Mayor Simango emphasized that funds were from Beira’s own tax collections and that the building of an additional market was being postponed in order to accommodate this emergency response.

Another factor that may have contributed to Mayor Simango’s ability to effectively and quickly improve the CMB’s performance of trash collection was a fortuitous change in the price of garbage containers. During the mandate of Mayor Muchangage, Beira had to purchase containers from Maputo, which where both expensive and were accompanied by high transportation costs. According to one of the trash teams, within three months of Mayor Simango’s election, trash collection improved because the process became more regimented and organized with the adherence to schedules and planned routes. The CMB has approximately 364 trash collectors who work in teams in three-month shifts. They work three shifts during the day, which provides approximately 20 hours of coverage. However, the improvement, according to these workers, in city services began in 1999 with the introduction of great local autonomy as a result of decentralization. The key difference the trash collectors identified between 1999 and 2003 was that they began to see better trash vehicles and the salary has been regularly paid on time.
civil society organizations were active because they swept streets and cleaned drains in informal neighborhoods when donor funds were available. Like Maputo, donors worked with neighborhoods organizations to improve trash collection. Unlike Maputo, the partnership between neighborhood organizations and donors in Beira did not build their organizational capacity to become contractors and, thereby, become financially sustainable. As will be discussed, it was mayoral leadership and own-source revenue increases that improved trash collection in Beira.

All focus groups concurred that the CMB’s trash collection service had greatly improved almost immediately under Mayor Simango. Palmeiras residents acknowledged that they saw a larger improvement between the Muchangage and Simango Administrations than they saw since 1999. These participants saw Simango as personally responsible for the change and attributed reinvigorated city services to his own personal commitment. “People are motivated now because of Simango. Nobody before wanted to contribute but now, there is political will,” shared one participant. Furthermore, participants trust him with public funds. “We don’t want people who take the money and put it in their pockets. (Simango)
takes the money and does something with it." Most Ponta Gêa participants concluded that trash collection was an area where they had seen vast improvement, attributing this improvement to Mayor Simango. Despite the dissatisfaction with paying the fees, participants acknowledged that the situation had changed for the better.

While focus groups indicated that the CMB’s performance of trash collection had improved, local civil society organizations, specifically neighborhood associations, were not the main factors driving this performance, but rather donors and the mayor’s direct intervention. Instead of Maputo’s situation where contractual relationships created a market for microenterprises, there was no avenue for sustainable income. As such, these organizations relied largely on donors to piece together the equipment needed and service to informal neighborhoods remains irregular. Despite these conditions, focus group participants signaled confidence in Mayor Simango’s ability to clean up the city because of improvements they noticed outside their neighborhoods.  

15 Participant, Palmeiras I focus group, Beira, March 17, 2009.

16 Located in Zone 1, Ponta Gêa is comprised of five sub-bairros or units (A-E), totaling 18,382 residents, with Unit E, where Goto market is located, being the most populous. The neighborhood is bordered by Samora Machel Avenue, the beach, Armando Tivane Avenue on the north, and July 24th Avenue. Author interview, Secretary of Ponta Gêa, Beira, March 14, 2009.

17 Residents were asked to rank the top three actions they would undertake to improve city services. The majority of the respondents indicated great confidence in voting indicating that they would participate in the electoral process. Half of the respondents ranked second that they would organize a group to press the CMB to improve service, again revealing that residents expect the actions to improve their trash collection to be undertaken by the CMB primarily. So, despite the complaints that trash collection within the bairro should be improved, overall, respondents have a great deal of confidence in the CMB’s insofar as the Mayor is concerned. Another group exercise reiterated these findings. Consistent with this first choice, residents selected that the CMB has a good process for consulting with the residents and that it is worth participating in the electoral process.
donors were working with the CMB to improve trash collection, unlike in Maputo, these efforts were not always coordinated with the CMB and neighborhood leadership in a way to make these efforts a sustainable extension of the municipality, thus preventing improvement in municipal capacity and performance. Evidence from two neighborhoods illustrated how the lack of incentives and capacity for residents to organize, miscommunication, and a lack of a contractual connection to the CMB created and facilitated unsustainable and fragile associations.

2.2.2 Weak Neighborhood Associations: Influence of External Actors

Neighborhood associations in Beira were weak because they were not financially sustainable and did not have influence over municipal policy to improve trash collection. They were active, however, because external actors—specifically donors and the Catholic University of Beira (CUB)—sporadically provided financing and supplies. The support I observed did not facilitate the kind of sustainable relationship between the municipality and organization present in Maputo to be able to extend municipal service to improve trash collection.

Inhamodima and Munhava shared a common factor: external actors greatly influenced the creation and sustainability of community organizations in the area of trash collection. Although Munhava’s experience is more positive than Inhamodima’s, unlike with Maputo’s microenterprises, community organizations in Inhamodima were unable to maintain a sustainable level of operations because of a lack of coordination between the municipality and the CUB. In Munhava, the
donor was working closely with the CMB as a part of a major overhaul of the drainage system, which required high levels of coordination between both the municipality and the donor. This condition was absent in Inhamodima. The miscommunication in Inhamodima between the Catholic University staff and neighborhood leadership persisted and, ultimately, resulted in the end of this project.

The CUB began a project in 2005 in two subsections (units A and B) of Inhamodima, with 30 volunteers from the neighborhood. The purpose of the project was to organize the community to volunteer to carry out primary trash collection in the neighborhood. Over the two years the project ran, volunteers swelled from 30 to 200 individuals. Volunteers expected to be remunerated, an expectation stoked by the bairro Secretary who implied that the CUB would bring donor funds to eventually pay residents. Although the CUB had paid for materials, remuneration was not included. By March, 2007, CUB organizers, and community residents held a cantankerous meeting in which volunteers demanded that they be paid. They requested USD$2,000 per volunteer per year, an amount the CUB had neither promised nor budgeted. The meeting ended with residents feeling insulted and the project defunct.

While Inhamodima’s experience with donors resulted in misunderstandings that terminated the project, Munhava’s experience did not. Interviews suggest that Africa 70’s investment in Munhava’s drainage system required cooperation with the CMB, neighborhood leadership, and neighborhood organizations. Africa 70,
The views in this paper are that of the author alone. Please forward comments to bea.reaud@american.edu

along with the UNDP, undertook a major drainage project requiring a multiyear, multistage effort with the CMB. A key component of this project was coordinating with neighborhood organizations. As a result, Africa 70 conducted a census of neighborhood organizations and began identifying the ones it could fund due to its funding availability. This NGO was co-located with the neighborhood leadership and, when misunderstandings arose, Africa 70 staff worked to correct them immediately. This coordination between the CMB, neighborhood leadership and neighborhood organizations, while not immediately generating sustainable organizations, did provide some short-term primary trash collection and drainage clean-up.

Africa 70 identified over 20 community associations in Munhava. These associations raised awareness in the neighborhood regarding various aspects of sanitation and health. VIDEK conducts primary trash collection, clears drains and raises awareness about the need for proper waste disposal. External actors played a pivotal role in establishing and supporting VIDEK. ESSOR, a French organization working on improving Munhava’s sanitation, suggested that the

---

18 There is an informal group of young people who clean the drains called the Youth League that works in the 12th sub-bairro. Another group, Fight for Life (Luta Pela Vida) is another community organization that takes care of orphan children in Munhava Matope, one of the poorest sub-bairros in Munhava, located adjacent to the dump. Two organizations, Light in the Community (Luz Na Comunidade) and Child Orphans Auxiliary (Auxilio das Crianças Orfeas) are religious organizations that work within Munhava to assist individuals with HIV/AIDS and orphans. These organizations also extend their work to promote the use of latrines, cleaning of water to reduce transmission of cholera.

19 VIDEK has about 24 members, most of whom are drawn from Munhava Central, who work on cleaning the drains and raising awareness about the connection between sanitation and sicknesses like cholera, typhoid and malaria. Members are charged on average 10 MTn/month to participate and can be charged an initiation fee. However, these fees do not cover the costs of their activities.
residents form a group that focuses on drainage and sanitation, resulting in VIDEIC. However, it lacked sustainable support to continue activities. Then, in 2007, VIDEIC began working with CUAMM, an Italian NGO, to build ecological latrines and by 2008, VIDEIC began working with Africa 70 to identify the families that could afford to partially subsidize the latrines. Today, VIDEIC contracts residents to act as door-to-door activists and provides a small subsidy for these activities. Initially, neighborhood residents were suspicious of VIDEIC’s representatives when they did their door-to-door campaigns. Six years later, VIDEIC has been able to overcome these perceptions because they live in the community and are known by the bairro leadership. However, they still expand and contract based on available donor funding.

A major difference between Maputo and Beira was that in Maputo, donors both provided supplies, helped build civil society organizations’ capacity to act as contractors for the city, and helped lobby the CMM to provide these organizations contracts. In Beira, this was not the case. Funding from external actors was

---

20 The VIDEIC president indicated that, since 2004, he has seen “things started to move”. “The CMB is working and so is the community,” he shared. Interestingly, unlike Inhamodima, where external actors were perceived to have damaged the community’s desire and ability to organize, the VIDEIC president observed that donors in Munhava have “helped psychologically change people’s way of thinking” by identifying problems within the community that could galvanize residents. Author interview, VIDEIC President of the Assembly, Munhava Central bairro office, Beira, March 26, 2009.

21 Another organization in Munhava Central is the Trash Committee, which is comprised of five residents who voluntarily keep the tertiary drains clean of rubbish and debris so that the water does not stagnate. It began in 2005 as a result of CUAMM support primarily to educate the population about the spread of cholera but ceased work in 2007 due to lack of gear. They started work again with Africa 70 in March 2009, with gloves, masks, shovels and hand carts to do the work. The trend evident in Beira, Matola, Dondo and, to a lesser extent, in Maputo, is that community organizations tend to increase their activities when there is donor funding and become dormant until external funding is available. These organizations are primarily active in Munhava Central, the area, which appears to have the highest donor intervention.
sporadically available and did not create financially sustainable organizations in the area of trash collection. In Inhamodima, the CUB’s project ended in a massive breakdown in a large *bairro* initiative because communication was not clear about the scope of the project and its purpose. In Munhava, although community organizations existed and worked within the community, their activities were largely influenced by sporadically available donor funding. In both instances, municipal performance of trash collection did not improve but trash collection within the neighborhood temporarily did due to funding from external actors. Unlike the case of Maputo, Beira’s Inhamodima and Munhava neighborhood organizations did not get technical assistance to help them to act as contractors, extending the CMB’s reach and improving performance.

### 2.3 Dondo

I hypothesized that Dondo’s (CMD) strong civil society organizations would have a prominent role in Dondo’s performance of trash collection and market management (see Table 1.3). As I previously indicated, I expected civil society organizations to exert pressure over the municipality to compel them to provide vendors and citizens better services. In Dondo, the main pressure from residents came not through civil society organizations but rather a donor-funded participatory budget process the CMD instituted with the help of the Austrian Development Cooperation.

#### 2.3.1 Dondo Trash Collection
Civil society organizations in the area of trash collection were weak in Dondo because they were not financially sustainable and did not influence municipal policy. However, of all the cases, focus groups expressed the highest degree of confidence in the CMD’s performance, not just in trash collection, but other areas. Interviewees credit these improvements to Dondo’s participatory budget process. Initially funded by the Austrian Development Cooperation, Mayor Cambezo instituted Dondo’s participatory process to stimulate resident feedback on municipal infrastructure investment. This process encourages residents to vote on neighborhood projects and track CMD investments. All focus group members immediately identified various CMD improvements, not only trash collection but also paved roads, running water and new municipal buildings, attributing Dondo’s success to annual bairro-level consultations through its participatory budget process. Despite overall satisfaction, all focus group members observed that the informal neighborhoods still experience problems with inadequate trash collection.

Focus group participants offered that the CMD was doing a good job but that more

22 Like Beira, Dondo’s community organizations are somewhat weak because they are generally not self-sustainable. However, the CMD has arranged a partnership with one community organization that allows the organization to support activities. With ten activists and 250 members, Project UDAD’s mission is to raise community awareness regarding hygiene and the dangers of open-air defecation on public health. Although the CMD does not contract with UDAD for these activities, they have allowed them to keep fees they charge for use of public bathrooms. Despite the absence of a CMD contract, the ability to keep bathroom and member fees allowed UDAD to raise almost 6,800 MTn/month ($256 USD) which they use to pay their activists 300 MTn/month each ($11.32 USD) with about 400 MTn/month ($15.09 USD) remaining.

23 Informal neighborhood participants indicated that management had gotten better since 1999, some pointing to the specific work the CMD did on improving the roads. When asked what were the top three municipal responsibilities, participants mentioned the construction of markets, public bathrooms, schools, mortuary, roads, and a school. Participants of the group with informal and formal members combined also pointed to water provision, assistance to orphans and widows, combating erosion and partnerships with donors and other NGOs.
trash trucks and workers were needed, as well as advanced technology associated with modern trash collection since the CMD still relied on trash drums and a tractor to collect waste.  

While informal neighborhoods do not all receive regular trash collection, the CMD’s participatory budget process extends to all neighborhoods of the municipality as a way to both manage resident expectations by making town councilors accessible to members of the public and getting citizen proposals on potential infrastructure investments in their neighborhoods. CMD residents have direct access to high-ranking town councilors. Informal neighborhood residents indicated that they could raise complaints directly to the town councilors. Furthermore, these residents indicated that the CMD has a history of completing projects, the result of its annual participatory budgeting process, which instilled confidence in the CMD. In the cases in which projects were delayed, one participant stated that it is usually the fault of funding delays among CMD partners. So, while civil society organizations in this area were generally weak, the CMD instituted a process that allows regular communication between the CMD and residents, which is evidence of an active civil society.

---

24 According to one participant, trash collection in the informal neighborhood occurs weekly. Like informal neighborhood participants, formal participants indicated other areas in which the CMD improved, like construction of markets and water fountains and the provision of water 24 hours a day instead of just 6 hours a day. Participant, Focus Group, Dondo, November 11, 2008.

25 Although one could argue that Dondo’s size makes it easier to improve service and have open communication on municipal projects, I argue that consistent leadership and clear communication to residents spread over a fairly large area are primarily responsible for municipal service improvements as 48 percent of Mozambican municipalities have populations less than Dondo and Dondo has been a successful model.
2.3.2 Weak Community Organizations, Active Participatory Process: Variation in Sustainable Internal Support

Despite weak organizations, focus group participants were generally satisfied with the CMD’s performance and credit this to the municipality’s consultation process. In Dondo, the Austrian Development Cooperation funded its participatory budget process starting in 1999, which continues to inform the CMD’s decision-making on investments of its infrastructure budget. Each bairro has a consultative council, which articulates proposals to the CMD for community funding priorities. The council has a representative to a specific town councilor who in turn is also charged with representing that neighborhood. They have annual consultations to help formulate the budget allocations for funds like the FCA. Furthermore, the five-year strategic plan is also composed through a community consultation process. I attributed focus group participants’ satisfaction with services as a combination of actual municipal performance and of this unique consultation process, which helped residents understand the CMD’s constraints.

While this process is considered to be a national model, local researchers have concluded that it is not clear how the input from the neighborhood councils is incorporated into the final resource allocations in Dondo’s municipal budget (Nuvunung, Mosse, Varela 2007, 13-14). As a result, I classified this civil society in Dondo as active, because the participatory budget process institutes a framework of vertical accountability but not strong, because it is unclear the

26 Municipal Compensation Fund or Fundo Compensação Autárquica (FCA) is the generally the largest central government transfer dedicated to paying for municipal infrastructure investment.
degree to which these consultations modified municipal decisions and policies towards infrastructure investments.

2.4 Matola

I would expect to find either weak civil society organizations or paucity of civil society organizations in Matola (CMMa) as this was a case where performance in trash collection was rated low (see Table 1.3). I also found that selective service provision in trash collection was more pronounced in Matola than in the other three cases. Focus groups indicated that trash collection was selective in their neighborhoods and directed only at bairro leadership.

2.4.1 Matola Trash Collection

Interviewees and focus groups indicated that there were no civil society organizations working in the area of trash collection. Unlike the other three municipalities, interviewees suggested that trash collection had not comparably improved in Matola. According to interviews with trash collectors and focus groups, the CMMa’s trash collection service has not improved since 2000, when the CMMa had no trash containers and piles of trash festered in the streets. Service was erratic and linked to the bairro leadership. One participant stated that residents have had to chase the trash tractor down the street because they did not stop to collect the trash. Another focus group participant stated that the tractor does not have a structured route in the neighborhood and tends to pass all the

---

27 Matola A focus group, Matola, November 20, 2008.
houses on the block, only to stop at the bairro Secretary’s house to collect his trash. Another interviewee indicated that the CMMa needs to finish with the social discrimination when they pick some areas and not others to be serviced just because “VIPs live there.” Lack of confidence was so high that half of focus group in one neighborhood indicated they should stop paying fees, the highest of any case study city. Even one knowledgeable source admitted that much does not happen in Matola because of “lack of political will”.

2.4.2 Lack of Municipal and Community Capacity

The CMMa lacked basic capacity—specifically, trained personnel and systems—to deal with the municipality’s growth and corresponding flood of trash and this was evident in several examples. Of the four cases, Matola had the lowest ratio of trash collectors to residents, indicating that there are not enough sanitation workers to keep up with the trash flow (Census 2007). Unlike the other three cases, the CMMa has no audit staff to raise awareness about trash collection or to fine residents for improperly disposing of trash. This lack of personnel and procedure was so pronounced that some donors have decided not to work with the CMMa. One donor that works in solid waste management shared that they could not proceed with work when the CMMa’s lack of staff capacity became an impediment to the project. Unlike the other three cases, Matola suffers from a lack

---

28 Beira had 1,621 residents per trash worker, followed by Dondo with 2,556 residents per trash collector, then Maputo with 3,140 residents per trash collector. Matola had by far the lowest, with 42,213 resident per trash collector. Author’s calculations using data from municipal staff interviews and 2007 Census.
of community organizations that work in the area of trash collection and sanitation and no alternative to interacting with the municipality.

3. Conclusion

Fatton stated the relationship between civil society and the state best in observing that “there is a dialectical interaction between state and civil society. The state is transformed by a changing civil society; civil society is transformed by a changing state. Thus, state and civil society form a fabric of tightly interwoven threads, even if they have their own independent patterns” (Fatton 1995, 67). I began this chapter hypothesizing that strong civil society organizations affect municipal performance. I argued that civil society would affect municipal performance because participation enables civil society, either as organizations, neighborhood trash groups, or processes, such as Dondo’s participatory budget process or boycotts as was the case with the trash fee in Maputo, exert pressure on municipalities to improve municipal services. In order to examine trash collection, I studied the organizations and processes that existed in these spaces. I gauged the strength of civil society organizations and processes by their access to and control over financial resources or their financial sustainability and their ability to influence municipal policy. I found that: strong civil society is not a prerequisite for strong municipal performance in trash collection; the relationship between civil society and the municipality mattered in terms of how civil society was able to assist the municipality in improving services in the two test areas; and, that donors
that provided aid which built the capacity of civil society organizations to perform services led to sustainable improvements in trash collection in informal neighborhoods. I also found that Maputo was the only case in which I observed neighborhood organizations that become city contractors. Lastly, it was the only case in which a boycott of trash fee payments led to a revision of the trash fees.

Maputo, Beira and Dondo all were determined to have high levels of performance in the test areas even though Maputo was the only case where civil society was deemed to be strong. In Maputo and Dondo, donors provided assistance that built capacity in civil society. In Maputo, donors provided supplies and assistance in formalizing neighborhood associations to collect trash in the informal neighborhoods. They also worked with the CMM to help these organizations gain access to municipal contracts so that they could consistently extend the municipality’s provision of trash collection services to previously inaccessible areas. In Dondo, the Austrian Development Cooperation’s investment in Dondo’s participatory budget process gave residents a direct link to the municipality, extended the municipality’s ability to get citizen feedback by placing CMD town councilors in charge of hearings in appointed neighborhoods and ability to provide input on the kinds of projects they wanted to see funded in their neighborhoods on an annual basis. In Beira, donor assistance focused on providing supplies to neighborhood organizations to clean, sweep and collect trash but this assistance did not result in sustainable organizations extending the reach of
municipal services or processes that instituted accountability mechanisms between the residents and the municipality.

My research indicated that donors supported building the capacity of civil society organizations that contributed to improvement in municipal performance (although to varying degrees) in three of the four cases. In Dondo and Maputo (and lesser, extent in Beira’s Munhava sanitation project), donor aid built capacity and municipalities partnered with them to deliver services. In Maputo, boycotts of trash fees caused the municipality to revise its fee schedule, with the technical assistance of AGRESU into a schedule which is now a national model and (more importantly) was a level fee-payers were much more willing to pay. This, in turn, institutes a self-sustainability to Maputo’s trash collection services that was absent before. Trash organizations also benefitted from donor assistance in pressuring the CMM into providing them contracts to collect trash in informal areas. In Dondo, the Austrian Development Corporation funded Dondo’s initial experiment with participatory budgeting, which continues to be a process by which the CMD gathers input on infrastructure allocations annually.

In Beira, Africa 70 worked closely with community leaders and organizations in Munhava neighborhood to install and upgrade sections of Beira’s water sanitation system. In all three cases, Merchant Associations acted as interlocutors between the municipality and vendors to improve infrastructure and sanitation in the markets. However, only in Maputo were these associations able to gain control and access to a portion of fees collected to improve markets as they saw it. In Matola, these conditions
were absent. Merchant Associations were weak and neighborhood trash associations absent.

However, even in the three cases where participation and voice contributed to improved municipal services, there are examples of how participation did not have a positive effect on municipal performance. In Beira, Munhava neighborhood trash organizations were active only when donor funds were present. In Inhamodima neighborhood, the CUB project actually ended poorly due to miscommunication on remuneration. In Dondo, while the participatory budget process connected residents to the municipality and provided a vehicle to inform infrastructure investment allocations, ultimately, local scholars concluded that it was unclear how much the CMD relied on that feedback in making those allocations.

The 2002 protests in Maputo over the introduction of the flat trash fee at the peak of inadequate municipal collection provided another example of how participation and voice caused a change in municipal policy. It is also the only case in which citizen protests over the introduction of the trash fee actually pressured the CMM to withdraw these fees, do outreach, and reintroduce another approach that was more consistent with citizen expectations. By 2003, a fee schedule had been adopted and implemented in Maputo that was met with a better reception by its citizens. Throughout the process, AGRESU worked closely as a technical advisor to the CMM in introducing and then re-introducing the revised fee scale and working to create a sustainable, multi-year plan for financing trash collection in Maputo through fee revenue. Furthermore, this opening for citizens to negotiate with the CMM also
opened the CMM to working with neighborhood organizations as contractors to extend trash collection to notoriously inaccessible informal neighborhoods. Boycotts in this instance, did improve trash collection in the time period observed. However, it was what the boycotts did—improve communication between civil society organizations and donors working in this sector and the municipality—that facilitated improvement in three of the four cases studied.
Table 1.1. Hypothesis and Findings

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Hypothesis:</th>
<th>Decentralization creates incentives that motivate municipal government officials to act and opportunities for residents to pressure them.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>POLITICAL PRESSURE</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil Society:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Expected Finding</strong>:</td>
<td>Strong civil society can pressure municipal government to improve municipal services.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Finding</strong>:</td>
<td>Strong civil society is not a prerequisite to strong municipal performance. Civil society organizations are fluid and adaptive to resource availability. They affect municipal performance based the type of donor assistance it receives and its relationship with the municipality.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
**Table 1.2 Factors used to select municipal cases**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Municipality</th>
<th>Province</th>
<th>Civil Society</th>
<th>Revenue (USD, per capita)</th>
<th>Voting</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Rank</td>
<td></td>
<td>1998</td>
<td>2003</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Beira</td>
<td>Sofala</td>
<td>L</td>
<td>32.46</td>
<td>6.57</td>
<td>HH</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Dondo</td>
<td>Sofala</td>
<td>H</td>
<td>28.35</td>
<td>9.54</td>
<td>HH</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Nampula</td>
<td>Nampula</td>
<td>H</td>
<td>11.89</td>
<td>10.23</td>
<td>LH</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Maputo</td>
<td>Maputo</td>
<td>H</td>
<td>18.74</td>
<td>6.32</td>
<td>LH</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Nacala-Porto</td>
<td>Nampula</td>
<td>L</td>
<td>24.01</td>
<td>4.70</td>
<td>LH</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Cuamba</td>
<td>Niassa</td>
<td>H</td>
<td>1.26</td>
<td>5.26</td>
<td>LL</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Quelimane</td>
<td>Zambezia</td>
<td>H</td>
<td>3.94</td>
<td>5.93</td>
<td>LL</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Vilankulos</td>
<td>Inhambane</td>
<td>L</td>
<td>3.32</td>
<td>7.96</td>
<td>LH</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Chimoio</td>
<td>Manica</td>
<td>L</td>
<td>9.98</td>
<td>4.19</td>
<td>LL</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Gurue</td>
<td>Zambezia</td>
<td>L</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>1.59</td>
<td>LL</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>Matola</td>
<td>Maputo</td>
<td>L</td>
<td>3.18</td>
<td>2.42</td>
<td>LL</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>Monapo</td>
<td>Nampula</td>
<td>L</td>
<td>0.25</td>
<td>6.08</td>
<td>LL</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

H=2, M=1.5, L=1
Table 1.3 Expected versus Actual Findings

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>CIVIL SOCIETY</th>
<th>MUNICIPAL PERFORMANCE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Expected</td>
<td>Actual</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MAPUTO</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trash Collection</td>
<td>Strong</td>
<td>Strong. Donors developed neighborhood-based trash collection capacity, which extended municipal capacity to trash to informal communities through municipal contracts.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BEIRA</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trash Collection</td>
<td>Strong</td>
<td>Active. Neighborhood organizations pick up trash in informal neighborhoods but activities were contingent on donor funding.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DONDO</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trash Collection</td>
<td>Strong</td>
<td>Active. Neighborhood groups raise awareness but do not provide services. However, a donor provided substantial assistance towards instituting a participatory budgeting, which has assisted in involving residents in decisions about municipal infrastructure fund allocations.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MATOLA</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trash Collection</td>
<td>Weak</td>
<td>Weak. Neighborhood organizations are not active.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

DRAFT
The views in this paper are that of the author alone.
Please forward comments to bea.reaud@american.edu
List of References


Directory of Development Organizations: Guide to International Organizations,


Francisco, António; Mucavele, Albertina; Monjane, Paul; Seuane, Sónia. Índice Da Sociedade Civil Em Moçambique 2007: A Sociedade Civil Moçambicana Por Dentro: Avaliação, Desafios, Oportunidades E Acção Foundation for Community Development. Maputo, 2008.


Nuvunga, Adriano; Mosse, Marcelo; Varela, César. Relatório Do Estudo Sobre Transparência, Áreas De Riscos E Oportunidades De Corrupção Em Seis Autarquias Moçambicanas: Chibuto, Chimoio, Dondo, Gurue, Nacala and Vilanculos. Maputo: Center for Public Integrity, 2007.

