



Foreign Aid and Democratic Consolidation in Africa

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
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Our Approach

- Disaggregate foreign aid into democracy and development assistance
- Quantitative, cross-country analysis from 1991-2008 and case studies of seven electoral democracies
- Focus on both transitions to multiparty rule and consolidation of democracy




Democratic Consolidation

- Continuous concept with both negative and positive “poles”

 Spectrum of democratic consolidation 		
<i>Avoiding breakdown</i>	<i>Avoiding erosion</i>	<i>Deepening democracy</i>
Preventing return to one-party regime or a cessation of leader selection via elections	Preventing deterioration in civil liberties and human rights, disrespect for key institutions and laws, averting elections that are not ‘free and fair’	Strengthening vertical accountability, reinforcing institutions that provide horizontal accountability, and creating competitive party systems

Transitions

- **Development aid has played a role in some democratic transitions**
 - Mechanism: precipitating discontent through economic reforms or demanding political reforms



Breakdown and Erosion

- **Democracy aid appears to discourage elites from certain decisions in the first place**
 - High levels of democracy aid associated with lower likelihood of multiparty breakdown
 - Risk of term-limit violations drops from 40% to less than 5% at high levels of democracy aid
 - Example: Oasis Forum in Zambia
- **Development aid used as *ex-post* tool to reverse elites' decisions**
 - Example: G19 donor strike in Mozambique
 - Corruption and electoral violations are priorities while human rights violations addressed more erratically
 - Issue of coordination is key for effectiveness

Vertical Accountability: Elections

- Democracy aid significantly effective at promoting free and fair elections




- Electoral support essential for civic and voter education, monitoring elections, ballot papers, electronic voter lists, and preventing election postponements

- Key concerns:

- Elections still seen as an event rather than a process
- Lack of EC autonomy in dominant party regimes

Vertical Accountability: Civil Society



Source: OECD-CRS Creditor Database

Vertical Accountability: Civil Society


- Greater consideration of CSO representivity
 - Development community uneasy with trade and labour unions
- Budget support viewed as reducing CSOs knowledge of, and input into, donor activities
- Democracy aid emphasizes capacity and fundraising rather than the legislative environment

Horizontal Accountability

- Democracy support essential for strengthening judiciaries, parliaments, audit offices, and anti-corruption bureaus
 - Notable successes:
 - Public Accounts Committee in Ghana; Anti-corruption commission and MP constituency offices in Zambia
- Consistent finding: General budget support further marginalizes the role of parliaments

Competitive Party Systems

- Party assistance receives least attention but extremely valuable for opposition parties
- Development aid tends to reinforce incumbent advantages, especially in dominant-party regimes



Key Findings

- Democratic consolidation ultimately internal affair but external actors do play an important role
- Democracy and development aid have different levers of influence over the democratization process
- Democracy aid will remain pivotal given Africa's changing development landscape
- Addressing how to reconcile trade-offs between the democracy and development communities remains a major policy priority